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Analogous to Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems is a theorem in physics to the effect that
the set of explanations of given evidence is uncountably infinite. An implication of this theo-
rem is that contact between theory and experiment depends on activity beyond computation
and measurement—physical activity of some agent making a guess. Standing on the need
for guesswork, we develop a representation of a symbol-handling agent that both computes
and, on occasion, generates a guess in interaction with an oracle. We show: (1) how physics
depends on such an agent to bridge a logical gap between theory and experiment; (2) how to
represent the capacity of agents to communicate numerals and other symbols, and (3) how
that communication is a foundation on which to develop both theory and implementation of
spacetime and related competing schemes for the management of motion.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Schro¨dinger, in his 1954 book “Nature and the Greeks,” laments [1]:
. . . science in its attempt to describe and understand Nature simplifies this very diffi-
cult problem. The scientist subconsciously, almost inadvertently, simplifies his prob-
lem of understanding Nature by disregarding or cutting out of the picture to be con-
structed, himself, his own personality, the subject of cognizance. Inadvertently the
thinker steps back into the role of an external observer. This facilitates the task very
much. But it leaves gaps, enormous lacunae, leads to paradoxes and antimonies when-
ever, unaware of this initial renunciation, one tries to find oneself in the picture or to
put oneself, one’s own thinking and sensing mind, back into the picture. This momen-
tous step . . . has consequences. So, in brief, we do not belong to this material world
that science constructs for us. We are not in it, we are outside. We are only spectators.
A start toward recognizing the role in physics of the physicist can be found in Go¨del’s incom-
pleteness theorems that show that mathematical logic in uncloseably open to additional axioms.
Go¨del exploited the writing of mathematics as strings of symbols, as did Turing in his definition of
computability. More recently, we recognized that both evidence and its explanations, as expressed
in quantum theory, are written in strings of symbols, and from this recognition we proved another
incompleteness theorem, to do with explanations in terms of wave functions and operators that fit
evidence expressed as parameter-dependent probabilities:
Theorem: The set of inequivalent explanations that exactly fit given probabilities is
uncountably infinite [2].
Logically, there can be no unique explanation. Of course, physicists collaborate and compete with
one another to develop a dominant explanation. By virtue of the theorem however, the assertion of
particular explanations reaches beyond logic; the assertion is a conjecture, an hypothesis, in short,
a guess, even if a community coalesces around it. And the guess is forever subject to refutation, so
that physics involves and endless open cycle in which physicists act as agents that make guesses
[3]. Here, not as an opinion but stemming from a proof within quantum theory, is a role in physics
for the physicist.
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FIG. 1. Agent’s open cycle of guessing and testing
Facing up to symbols and the agents that handle them in physical investigations opens a whole
new arena of physics, ready for exploration. Agency in physics has been discussed from several
points of view [4–9]. We focus on agents that perceive and use symbols. But how, in the con-
text of physics, can one to speak of symbols? Physics has sometimes been viewed as a quest for
“fundamental elements”, mainly particles and fields, from which “all physical descriptions” could
be constructed; however, this quest has been challenged, and in its place one can now enjoy more
latitude, thanks in part to notions of “emergence” made prominent in explaining phenomena of
condensed matter [10]. Availing ourselves of the latitude to take symbols as elements of descrip-
tion from computer science and engineering, here we advance notions of symbols and the agents
that handle them, with implications for theories of spacetime and their implementations.
II. AGENTS PERCEIVE SYMBOLS
In order to introduce into physics the notions of symbols and the agents that perceive them, we
need first to distinguish perception from measurement. Here is a homely experiment on perception.
I sit at a table and pick up a magazine with pictures that I have not already looked at. I shut my
eyes and turn the cover to expose the first page, still with my eyes shut. Then I blink, very briefly
4opening my eyes and quickly shutting them again. I have an fleeting image of seeing a picture of a
tiger. Then I repeat the process. Two or three glances later, the image stabilizes, not into a tiger by
into a woman sitting on a couch. This little story illustrates the claim in Pattern Theory of a two-
way flow between brain and eye: the brain proposes forms that the eye confirms or rejects [11]. In
some circumstances, I can make definite, stable perceptions, while outside these circumstances my
perceptions are unstable. In circumstances in which I achieve a stable perception, that perception
might be wrong—as when confronted by an illusion, as in the Ames demonstrations [12], but
my perception is not uncertain in the way a measurement is, with its systematic and statistical
uncertainties.
In theoretical work at the blackboard, physicists perceive the symbols—numerals, letters, plus
and minus signs, etc.—in which they write and read both evidence and its explanations. But what
about experiments at the workbench in which they measure something? To measure something,
one has to first perceive what is to be measured. To measure the voltage on a wire at a moment,
a person must perceive the the voltmeter, the wire to be measured, and the moment at which to
make the measurement, in distinction to other devices, other wires, and other moments.
In particular, what about measuring the physical transmission of symbols? Suppose Person
A perceives the words in an email sent by Person B. A third Person C can measure the physical
transmission of the email from A to B. Person C may measure voltage levels at moments when
these convey binary symbols (bits) that code a higher level symbol (letter of the alphabet or word),
along with timing relations among various voltages. Person C’s measurements produce numbers
accompanied by uncertainties that contrast with Person B’s perception of letters on the computer
screen. The investigative Person C who measures must also perceive. For example, Person C has
to perceive both what is to be measured and the devices used to measure it.
To say that one perceives a symbol is to say that one registers something, distinct from some-
thing else. When perception matters, the symbol perceived matters to ones next action, distinct
from something else that would contribute to a different action. We will discuss circumstances
necessary to cases in which, apart from occasional failures, the perception of symbols is unam-
biguous; for example, one perceives a dog as distinct from a cat. While the cat you pet is more
than a symbol, to recognize the cat as a cat is to recognize ‘cat’ as a symbol.
Two interrelated questions: what sort of entity has the capability to perceive, and what sort
of entity is it that is perceived? Not just people, but other living organisms make distinctions,
e.g. between self and non-self, and thus also perceive. To perceive is to register a sensing in
5some category and not in others. Without an entity’s capacity to make such distinctions, the entity
cannot be said to perceive. We call such an entity an symbol-handling agent, whether it is a
living organism of a machine. For the second question—what sort of entity is perceived—we
propose that whatever is perceived is reasonably called a symbol. Perception assigns a sensing to a
category, without measuring it. Such categories are elements of thought, having much in common
with mathematical entities that are not measured but are defined in relation to other such entities.
Words are symbols. For perception as we mean it in this report, humans perceive by labeling with
words. Wordless organisms that perceive must have other ways of labeling, that is, of assigning
symbols.
Symbols and symbol-handling agents are terms of description available at widely varying levels
of detail. I may see myself as handling symbols, and I may inquire into evidence of symbol
handling on the part of mantra within my cells. A word as a symbol can be coded in letters of an
alphabet which in turn can be coded in bits.
What capabilities, besides the perception of symbols, are to be ascribed to an ‘agent’? I see
a core capability of agency as a feature of the human condition: I respond to surprises. When
the surprise comes to me, my sense is that it comes in part from the unknowable but also in part
from me, because I’ve been working on something, and the surprise from the unknowable and the
surprise from me combine to come up with a guess. We think of an agent as taking steps, one
after another, and as equipped with a memory. Each “next step” of an agent is influenced both
by the contents of its memory and by an inflow of symbols from an environment that includes
other agents, and also by a logically undetermined “oracle” external to the agent [13]. Guesses
emerge from an agent interacting with an oracle, the workings of which we refrain from trying to
penetrate.
III. STEERING RHYTHMS OF PERCEPTION
People delegate a variety of symbol-handling tasks to mechanized agents, such as the com-
puter at which I now write. Although stripped of emotional capacity, dead, computer networks
are important to understanding symbol-handling agents in two ways. First, human handling of
symbols leaves records in computer networks that serve as evidence. Second, computer networks
exhibit rhythms of symbol handling important to agency in general. Computer networks pervade
the modern technological world, and not only in the form of the Internet. When I bring my car
6to the repair shop, the first thing checked is often the computer network that mediates between
my eyes, hands, feet, and the mechanisms for steering, braking, and communication. Records of
mechanized agents visible in computer based records are a heretofore overlooked topic for physi-
cal investigation. The computers that work as networked agents have much to teach us about the
perception of digital symbols, to do with rhythms of perception that require continual maintenance,
guided by responses to analog deviations that are logically undetermined.
Analog machinery is idiosyncratic: two people using a slide rule get slightly different answers.
The huge strength of digital, as opposed analog, computation comes from the capacity of a digital
computer to make exact calculations by means of inexact machinery. Insofar as a person using
the computer is concerned, variations in the behavior of transistors leave a computer’s traffic in
0’s and 1’s unaffected. This is because the basic unit of memory, the flip-flop, works like a hinge
that can be recognized unambiguously as turned one way or the other, regardless of imperfections
in its manufacture and operation. Or think of a chess game in a player recognizes the placement
of a pawn on a square of the board in spite of small deviations of the pawn from the center of
the square. But, as we shall see, recognizing symbols unambiguously is possible only within a
system of analog adjustment. The hand guided by the eye places the pawn more or less in the
middle of a square of a chess board—a performance in which noticing variations is necessary to
the adjustment of motion.
Analogous steering in the handling of digital symbols shows up with special clarity in the
physics of computer networks, such as the networks used by human agents to mediate communi-
cations that generate evidence and convey explanations.
IV. MECHANIZED SYMBOL HANDLERS
In order to distinguish between what can be computed and what must come from beyond com-
putation (as guesses from interaction with an oracle), we imagine the extreme case of a symbol-
handling agent that, while open to guessing, possesses maximal computational capacity. Uncon-
cerned with practical limits on computing imposed by limits on memory or by limits on the rate at
which an agent computes, we formulate a mechanical agent having the computational capability
of a Turing machine. The Turing machine, however, requires modification to offer a place for
interaction with an oracle and for communication with other such machines.
In his 1936 paper, Turing briefly introduced an alternative machine called a choice machine,
7contrasted with the usual Turing machine that Turing called an a-machine:
If at each stage the motion of a machine . . . is completely determined by the [mem-
ory] configuration, we shall call the machine an “automatic machine” (or a-machine).
For some purposes we might use machines (choice machines or c-machines) whose
motion is only partially determined by the configuration . . . . When such a machine
reaches one of these ambiguous configurations, it cannot go on until some arbitrary
choice has been made by an external operator. This would be the case if we were
using machines to deal with axiomatic systems. [14].
We picture a mechanical symbol-handling agent as implementing a c-machine modified to take
part in a communications network. We call the c-machine modified in this way, with some ad-
ditional modifications to be described shortly, a Choice Machine. We posit that on occasion an
“oracle” writes a symbol onto the scanned square of the Turing tape of the agent’s Choice Ma-
chine privately, in the sense that the symbol remains unknown to other agents unless and until the
Choice Machine that receives the chosen symbol reports it to others [15]. There is no limit to the
number of symbols that the oracle can write [2].
V. CHOICE MACHINES PAIRED BY COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS
What affects one agent as a symbol need not be a symbol to another agent, but there are special
situations in which a pair of agents can communicate by sending symbols back and forth from
one agent to the other. In this report we attend to the pairing of one agent with another agent by
means of a two-way communications channel over which symbols that mean something to one
agent arrive at another agent that coherently responds.
Characterizations of flow of symbols, including their necessary synchronization, were dis-
cussed earlier [16–18]. Here we discuss the mathematical forms—one might say data structures—
that underpin concepts of space, time, and spacetime as used by physicists, and that also underpin
arrangements of devices that implement these concepts. We claim that these mathematical forms
are important to thinking about how organisms, human and non-human, manage motion.
8A. Symbol handling without metric
To develop the theory of symbol handling to be presented below, we avoid topics critical to
the engineering of physical networks. Thus we give no attention to how symbols might propagate
from agent to agent, e.g. by classical or quantum fields defined with respect to some coordinate
system with a metric tensor. Rather, our approach is non-metric; one might say topological. We
seek a theory of agents that maintain records of transmissions and of receptions of symbols from
one to another in a situation that need have no coordinate system available. Then there can be
no central clock, no assumption of any spacetime manifold and hence no metric tensor. Indeed
we must, so to speak, wipe these off the blackboard in order to get at the element of novelty in
attending to neworks of symbol-handling agents. Eschewing any reference to how symbols are
transmitted, propagated or received, we postulate that symbol-handling agents register moments
of transmission and reception of symbols, each agent using its own count of moments as a local
clock.
B. Forms of records used by agents to manage their motion
To think about agents managing their motions, we explore cases in which the Choice Machine
expressing a symbol-handling capability is augmented by a second tape that we call a clock tape.
Like the Turing tape, the clock tape is marked into squares, each of which can hold a single symbol,
and at any moment a Choice Machine scans a single square of the clock tape, but the motion of
the clock tape never reverses: at each move the scanned square of the clock tape shifts one place
to the right. Consider symbols arriving one after another at an agent A from an agent B. Agent A
can copy each symbol in the moment it arrives onto the scanned square of A’s clock tape. In this
way A maps the dynamic, temporal order of arrival of the symbols to a static, spatial order along
the clock tape.
Suppose that at some but not all of its moments, an agent A receives a symbol from B and
writes the received symbol on A’s clock tape. If the symbols arrive only occasionally, A records
these arriving symbols sparsely, so that successive symbols occupy not successive squares of A’s
clock tape but on squares separated by stretches ofA’s tape, stretches on whichAmay have written
symbols for its own use or symbols arriving from agents other than B. Consider a stretch of A’s
clock tape after such a performance. The ratio of the number of symbols recorded from B to the
9number of squares on A’s clock tape gives the average frequency ratio of symbol arrivals from B
to steps of A. Such frequency ratios are the recorded evidence of the speed ratio of A’s receptions
from B relative the speed of A’s stepping along its clock tape. These ratios are the basic form of
evidence of motion.
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FIG. 2. Clock-tape record of “frequency”
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Now we turn from frequency to distance. The basic form for distance in terms of records on
a tape is in terms of an echo count. An echo count is the number of squares from a symbol sent
to the return of an echo. That is, agent A, at the moment of scanning square n of its clock tape,
transmits a symbol to B, B echoes the symbol back to A, and the echoed symbol arrives as A
scans square n+ k; then k is an echo count from A to B and back.
The notion of echo count is a basis for distance. As discussed in more detail in [16, 17],
in special cases echo counts it can be aligned with distances as defined by Einstein in special
relativity, but echo count gives a property of records that is more basic than relativistic distance,
in that the concepts needs no assumption of any spacetime metric.
In discussing a lone agent, one might want to ask “what belongs to the agent?”, for example
a record of odds that the agent assigns to a bet could be said to “belong to the agent.” But when
agents communicate, some records are shared, so that ownership can be shared; communicating
agents differ drastically from lone agents. We take as fundamental the capacity of an agent, on
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occasion, to pair with another agent in communicating symbols. Then the question “what belongs
to an agent?” becomes embedded in a context of asking “what strings of symbols flow from one
agent to another?”. Strings of symbols bind the agents without belonging totally to one or the
other agent. It is a potentially interesting discipline to explore this and related questions, not just
in engineered systems but also in organisms, human and non-human, to explore situations in which
one can ask: “which record, what agents have access to the record, where and when (along their
own tapes) do they have this access?”
C. Evolution of forms of records
The analysis of the form of records of frequency and distance has the following implication.
Given that agents, by definition, can be seen as in interaction with oracles that are logically un-
determined, and given that records of symbols in the memories of agents are the basic form to
frequency and distance, we arrive at the insight that agents managing speed and distance operate
not as a single system of a logic of symbols landing on and departing from the squares of tapes,
but like extended arithmetics, they form an uncountable set, involving the evolution through the
logically undetermined entrance of symbols, e.g. from oracles.
We are interested in various possible paths of the evolution of ways in which agents manage
motion, especially in cases in which agents leave measurable tracks in the form of their clock
tapes. For example, human agents develop evolving national and international time standards.
One such thread of evolution consists in the concepts and the implementation of these concepts in
International Atomic Time (TAI). Recall that TAI rests on its base reference frequency of the elec-
tromagnetic radiation resonant with the transition between hyperfine energy levels of cesium 133
[16]. This reference frequency is employed, either directly or indirectly, in almost all physical in-
vestigation. But Cesium (or its contemplated replacement by an optical frequency) is by no means
the only type of reference imaginable or potentially fruitful. Other such threads of evolution of
symbolic communication among agents are candidates for exploration, and some are in use. For
example, the cutting-edge optical clocks now operating in National Metrology Laboratories have
an instability of about 1/100 of the cesium clocks that define the second. Therefore it makes no
sense to compare two such optical clocks by comparing each to the second: one compares them
directly. There is an interesting potential for alternative schemes of measuring motion based on
symbol exchange in the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO) experiment
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[19]. Still other schemes are candidates for explorations of the management of motion by biolog-
ical organisms, both human and non-human. “The frog starves to death in the presence of dead
flies, not because he is fastidious, but because he does not see them” [20]. Some recent crashes of
self-driving cars have been traced to “not seeing still objects.” What alternative to spacetime is it
in which the frog lives?
VI. DISCUSSION
While we needed to start, as in [2], with a “lone agent”, a lone agent is like “one hand clapping”:
Symbol-handling agents can’t function without being paired with other such agents via back-and-
forth communication of symbols. As discussed in [16], conflicts in synchronization place severe
limitations the potential for a given agent to communicate with other agents, and the potential for
conflicts generally limits the number channels that can operate concurrently to pair one agent with
another. Agent A may have to step out of communication with B if it is to enter communication
with C.
As we see it, the notion of objectivity has to do with expectations of agreement among records
made by different agents, rather than a notion of behavior devoid of agent participation.
The clock tape along which an agent steps is the core image of “local time,” without encum-
bering it with the notion, which for 40 years we have found baffling, of any “global time” [16].
Guesses by an agent, here thought of as arising in the interaction of an agent with an oracle,
influence not only how an agent resolves certain choices but also the agent’s organization; that is,
the agent’s capacity to perceive a situation that calls for a choice.
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